First, we observe that the compensation packages of management board members of Germany's DAX30-firms are closely linked to key performance measures such as return-onassets and EBIT.
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INTRODUCTION
Shareholder involvement in compensation decisions has evolved as the patent remedy that regulators choose to apply across jurisdictions when they aim to cure perceived deficits in executive pay. The latest add-on to this already impressive track record can be found in Articles 9a and 9b of the European Commission's proposal for a revised Shareholder Rights directive. 1 However, this relative uniformity in the general approach should not disguise the considerable variation in the respective institutional arrangements. A more granular analysis 2 indicates that while some jurisdictions opt for mandatory shareholder voice others leave shareholder involvement to managerial discretion, a result, which sometimes also hinges on the pertinent rules character as non-compelling self-regulation. While sometimes the shareholder vote is binding, 3 it is only consultative in other cases with varying degrees of soft coercion. Differences also pertain to how often shareholders have to be approached and on what exactly they are asked to vote on (remuneration policy, individual compensation packages ex post etc.).
At least in part, the observed differences can be traced to disagreement on say on pay's merits in general and its adequate design in particular. Furthermore, in comparative perspective, say on pay's potential to add value may also hinge on existing institutional alternatives: corporate law may either provide other governance arrange-ments that seek to align managements' remuneration packages with shareholder interests or-more broadly-pursue different strategies to prevent executive rent seeking. 4 This paper tries to shed light on some key aspects by presenting quantitative data that allows us to gauge the pertinent effects of the German natural experiment that originates with the 2009 amendments 5 to the Stock Corporation Act of 1965. From a corporate governance vantage, Germany represents an interesting example in several respects.
First, in its say on pay-regime it has opted for a voluntary, 6 non-binding shareholder consultation that pertains only to the general compensation scheme and attaches practically no legal sanctions to the vote. 7 Hence, in pertinent part German corporate law relies purely on market discipline as a function of negative cost of capital-effects that poor corporate governance should entail in efficient markets. It thus differs from those institutional set-ups that provide for rather rigid legal consequences in case of shareholder discontent and thus bolster shareholder voice with law's momentum.
Second, direct shareholder involvement in compensation decisions represents a legal transplant, which runs counter to the German tradition that vests the right to determine executive compensation with shareholder-and labor 6 Not even the self-regulating (comply-or-explain) German Corporate Governance Code contains a recommendation to consult the shareholder meeting in compensation matters.
7 Aktiengesetz [AktG, Stock Corporation Act], Sept. 6, 1965 , BGBl. I at 1089 provides that the shareholders' meeting of a listed company may resolve on the approval of the compensation scheme. The resolution shall not give rise to any rights or obligations; in particular, the obligations of the supervisory board pursuant to § 87 shall remain unaffected. The resolution shall not be voidable pursuant to § 243. 8 Large German firms are subject to codetermination, i.e. the supervisory board is filled with parity by shareholder and employee representatives. For a detailed description of the statutory foundations see Herbert Wiedemann, Codetermination by Workers in German Enterprises, 28 AM. J. COMP. L. 79 (1980) ; for a brief overview see Katharina Pistor, Codetermination in Germany: A Socio Political Model with Governance Externalities, in EMPLOYEES AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 163, 174-5 (Margareth Blair & Mark J. Roe eds., 1999) . the supervisory board (two tier system). Hence, say on pay may either improve a deficient arrangement or constitute a redundant, cost-hiking institution. More dramatic, the shift of competences from the supervisory board to the shareholder meeting that say on pay implies may even corrupt a well-functioning and theoretically sound governance arrangement. 9 Finally, looking at Germany is also rewarding insofar as the rather concentrated ownership structure of its firms 10 allows assessing, whether a formal say on pay-regime is nothing but a (superfluous) substitute for the influence a large blockholder usually has at hand through informal channels 11 or if it also represents a valuable tool for minorities. The latter hypothesis may draw on the intuition that, if massive divestments indeed represent a meaningful threat, 12 any expressed discontent of informed (minority) investors with key corporate governance practices should be attentively noticed as an early alarm and hence entail the consequence of a change of course. 9 On the theory that demands a strong bargaining agent for shareholders to negotiate proper incentive contracts with management see supra 2.1. Yet, as a tool to curb managerial self-service, say on pay arguably is ineffective as an antidote to tunneling by large blockholders.
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The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. We first briefly survey the theoretical and empirical literature on the merits of direct shareholder involvement in compensation decisions; through this, we further develop the hypotheses for our empirical analysis (infra 2). We start the latter with a description of our sample and the variables we design (infra 3). In our analysis we provide descriptive statistics and estimate regressions (infra 4). We finally conclude (infra 5).
SHAREHOLDER INVOLVEME NT IN BOARD REMUNERATIO N: THEORY AND EVIDENCE

INCENTIVE COMPENSATIO N AS A SOLUTION TO A GENCY CONFLICTS AND THE SIG-NIFICANCE OF DIRECT SHAREHOLDER INVOLVEM ENT
At first glance, the rationale underpinning the success story of say on pay-regimes across jurisdictions is straightforward and intuitive. The optimal contracting approach to executive compensation considers adequately designed incentive compensation as a powerful tool to attenuate the principal agent conflict between (dispersed) shareholders and managers.
14 The substantial criticism that was voiced, particularly during the last decade, does not challenge the basic presumptions of the approach that incentive compensation may align managers' interest with shareholder preferences. Yet, it posits that executives in public firms without dominant blockholders may have the power to influence compensation decisions in their favor and thus hamper optimal 13 For an influential description of the phenomenon of dominant shareholder 
TERESTS
Regardless of the merits say on pay may have in attenuating agency conflicts between managers and shareholders, it represents an institutional arrangement that by its very design can only exhibit knock-on effects, if the policy maker's goal is not only to align investors' and executives' interests but to serve a broader distributive agenda that seeks to curb total compensation levels in the interest of other corporate stakeholders. 21 Even where low approval rates or even rejection of compensation packages may be regarded as shareholder "outrage", 22 such insurrection may have nothing to do with total compensation levels -as long as they do not reach proportions that would divert a noticeable slice of corporate profits into managers' pockets. It is indicative that prominent proponents of high-powered incentive compensation as a tool to mitigate agency problems posited in the title of one of their articles that executive compensation "is not about how much you pay, but how".
23 In fact, sophisticated shareholders seem to adhere to this motto.
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In a similar vein, it is quite plausible that say on pay regimes cannot serve financial stability concerns: diversified shareholders are risk-neutral and will thus push management to take on any positive net-present-value project. As a consequence, shareholder involvement will not automatically result in less risky banks, even where implicit government guarantees are successfully resolved. Even to the contrary, it might worsen matters. Since part of banks' debt is not priced in an adequate, riskadjusted manner, because it is protected by deposit insurance and implicit government guarantees, 25 risk-neutral shareholders are willing to incentivize managers to engage in risk-shifting activities at the expense of taxpayers by taking on excessively risky projects. Yet, the composition of our dataset does not permit to further explore this hypothesis.
PRIOR EMPIRICAL ANALYSES
Most empirical surveys test the impact of say on pay in the U.K., certainly not least because this jurisdiction was the front-runner of the movement. 26 Most analyses are mainly concerned with the driving forces behind shareholder dissent and/or low approval rates 27 and their effect on executive compensation. Some studies investigate the direct link between negative voting turnouts and changes to individual employment contracts.
28 Others look at general and persistent changes in remuneration practices that could indicate a closer alignment of managers' incentives with shareholder interests as a result of the introduction of the U.K. say on pay-regime. These studies generally find (weak) evidence for such a link. Evidence from the U.K., 17 REV. FIN. 527, 535-47 (2013) . 29 Ferri & Maber, supra note 28 at 547-59; Conyon & Sadler, supra note 27 at 304-8; Carter & Zamora, supra note 27; Alissa, supra note 27; Sheehan, supra note 27 at 265-9. Similar research also scrutinized the Australian situation, looking at both the reasons for low approval rates and observable changes in compensation practices in response to the introduction of a say on pay-regime. 30 Event studies that seek to determine shareholders' assessment of say on payregimes by investigating cumulative abnormal returns for the date of the pertinent rule's announcement were first conducted for the U.S.
31 Subsequent contributions in this vein were motivated by the U.K. experience 32 and the Swiss policy experiment of 2008 with its introduction of a binding say on pay-vote in a referendum. 33 Methodologically related research scrutinizes the effect of the introduction of say on pay through precatory shareholder proposals in the U.S. 34 This strand of literature forms a subsection of surveys that seek to determine the general effect of shareholder empowerment on firm value. 35 An empirical study 36 that tries to find the determinants that drive negative votes in U.S. say on pay-decisions considers inter alia total stock returns as performance
measure, but does not analyze a time-series to gauge the medium-term effects that 30 Sheehan, supra note 27 at 265-9. the introduction of the say on pay-regime under Dodd-Frank may entail. Earlier studies also investigated the drivers of voting support for pay-related (non-binding) shareholder proposals in the U.S. and also specified their effect on CEO compensation. 37 Finally, a comprehensive study that surveys 38 jurisdictions also looks specifically at the correlation between say on pay and the design of compensation packages, thereby distinguishing carefully between the remuneration of CEOs and that of ordinary board members. 38 The analysis delineates a deceleration in the growth of CEO pay and its consequential approximation to that of ordinary board members.
Our study is similar to the strand of research that tries to measure say on pay's medium term effect on general compensation practices and goes thus beyond surveys in the legal literature that only present descriptive statistics on voting outcomes. 39 We use a hand-collected dataset to analyze the German natural experiment, which took place in a specific institutional setting. Limiting ourselves to one jurisdiction allows us to proxy some of its idiosyncrasies in more detail and thus shed new light on key hypotheses articulated in the debate. We pay particular attention to the link between say on pays' impact on executive-particularly CEO-compensation as well as firm performance measures and investigate the importance of ownership structures. The specificity of our data that distinguishes between several features in board members' compensation packages and pays close attention to executives' tenure allows us to significantly extend and challenge more general findings in similar research on Germany that show that say on pay has an effect on directors' remuneration if lagged over the years following the vote. 
SAMPLE DESCRIPTION
In order to investigate the potential implications of say on pay on management remuneration in Germany, we hand-collected a data set for Germany's major firms, i.e. those included in the main stock market index, the DAX 30, for the years 2006-2014. Rather than focusing exclusively on CEO remuneration, we collected data for all members of the management board for the whole period under investigation. In order to identify ceteris paribus trends that are attributable to the introduction of say on pay, we concentrated on those companies that were included in the DAX30 at least during a part of the entire period and thus end up with 34 companies in our sample. This gives us information on 1669 remuneration packages for these 34 companies with an average size of the management board of 6.2 members, with a minimum of 4 and a maximum of 11 managers (including the CEO). The composition of our company base traces very closely the structure of the German economy with five financial companies (two banks, a financial exchange, and two insurance companies), five car manufacturers and suppliers as well as eight pharmaceutical companies (including chemical firms as well as medicine technique companies). The remaining firms are mainly other manufacturing companies.
Our data sample comprises information on management compensation, firm performance, general firm characteristics (such as size and industry to which the companies belong) as well as information on ownership structures. The data on management remuneration was taken from the firms' annual reports for the respective years. As a consequence of a 2005 overhaul of the relevant accounting standards, 41 executive compensation packages are reported on an individual basis for each member of the management board and have to be itemized with regard to fixed, variable and longterm incentive components. 42 Hence, we are able to track executive compensation over time. In doing so we pay close attention to the applicable accounting standards that particularly affect the representation of long-term components. 43 We are thus able to elucidate accurately what the reported figures actually reveal whereas prior research largely treats them as current payout. Information on say on pay-votes (including the percentage turnouts of these votes in favor or against the respective proposals) are also taken from the company accounts. We checked for completeness by consulting the firms' websites. 44 The general firm characteristics, such as size and market-to-book-ratios are drawn from Datastream for the respective years. In order to get data on ownership structures, we have made use of Commerzbank's compendium 41 (1)(6)(a)(5). 43 The relevant standards are laid down in Deutscher Rechnungslegungsstandard [DRS, German Accounting Standard] 17.21 and 17.30. Long-term non-share-based remuneration is reported as a whole for the financial year in which the compensated services were completed, i.e. at the time of the actual payout, DRS 17.21. On the other hand, long-term share-based remuneration is reported at present value for the financial year in which it was granted, DRS 17.30. Hence, key items of variable remuneration receive a critically diverging treatment in compensation reports. 44 Pursuant to AktG, § 130(6), German listed companies have to post detailed information on the votes (yes, no, abstain) for each resolution on their website within seven days. The pertinent information is also filed with the register, see AktG, § 130(5). "Wer gehört zu wem". 45 This data source comprises detailed information on ownership structures of German firms and their changes over time. We impound new information (since 2010) on significant holdings from the companies' register. 
DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES
The compensation reports-as mandatory items of the company accountsprovide detailed information on the remuneration of individual members of the management board. 47 Companies report not only the total level of compensation but also its structure in considerable detail. In particular, the different types of variable pay such as cash bonuses, stock options and long-term incentive plans are disclosed. However, this granular reporting makes comparisons across companies and over time quite difficult: not only do the observed compensation structures diverge materially but also the ways of reporting change over time, because firms do not have to comply with a prescribed form that would standardize disclosure. Hence, despite the risk of sacrificing some granularity, we decided to focus on the three main pillars of the compensation packages: fixed pay, variable remuneration and pension benefits. While fixed payments and pension contributions paid for the members of the management board are rather uniform across time and companies, there is quite some variation with regard to variable pay across time and companies, which should be kept in mind.
By looking at these three elements of managers' remuneration packages, we cover the main elements of monetary compensation and incentive schemes: fixed pay reflecting the overall participation constraint of management board members, variable pay as pay-for-performance (aligning the objectives of management and shareholders by incentivizing managers to provide effort), 48 and pension contributions paid for management board members as inside debt (to provide incentives to reduce risk and avoid default 49 ).
In order to achieve sufficient accuracy of discrimination we extract five variables from the firms' compensation reports. The first variable (FIX) reflects the fixed payments of the members of the management board, whereas the second variable 45 
COMMERZBANK, WER GEHÖRT ZU WEM [WHO BELONGS TO WHOM] (2010).
46 Wertpapierhandelsgesetz [WpHG, Securities Trading Act], July 26, 1994, BGBl I at 2708, § 21(1) compels any person whose shareholdings reaches, exceeds or falls short of 3%, 5%, 10%, 15%, 20%, 25%, 30%, 50%, or 75% of the voting rights in a listed company to disclose this fact immediately to the company and the supervisory authority. The pertinent notifications are then filed with the company register and thus made public. (VARPAY) is the sum of all variable compensation of the respective manager in a given year. In cases in which incentive plans were designed for more than one year, we divided the total amount reported at grant equally over the respective years and added the split-parts to VARPAY for each year. Our third variable (TEXP) is simply adding up these two elements and hence stands for total yearly payments ex pensions. Given that we have missing observations for pension contributions in a number of cases, we rely on this variable as our main measure of total compensation. In order to distinguish between CEOs and other members of the management board, we created a variable TEXPCEO measuring total yearly payments ex pensions for the CEO of the respective company. Last but not least, our PENSION variable denotes the pension contribution paid for the respective member of the management board. Table 1 gives a first overview of the main realizations of these variables.
Insert Table 1 about here With respect to pay structure, these numbers indicate that sources of income that are usually regarded as pay-for-performance are on average the most important remuneration elements for members of the management board. They exceed clearly the sum of fixed payments and pension contributions that managers are afforded. Surprisingly, pension contributions paid for management board members are rather small. With respect to variations across management board members, less surprisingly, CEO pay exceeds that of other management board members by far. This difference is also of high statistical significance, which indicates that the German system incrementally converges towards the American model of strong and prominent chief executives. 50 We observe a slightly skewed distribution with some outliers distorting the picture. Yet again, if we compare the mean and median of the different variables we find that this skewedness is not very pronounced. Hence, we can state that there clearly is variation-arguably explicable with the degree to which German firms seek to mimic the U.S. governance arrangement-with some (but not many) highly paid top managers (all CEOs), but that the discrepancies are not very large. Quite noteworthy, with respect to the overall size of the pay-check, we observe only six data points (among all 1669) where TEXP exceeded 10 mill. Euro. Moreover, these observations comprise 4 different CEOs.
Furthermore, we collected data to define a number of variables reflecting firm characteristics and firm performance, operative as well as stock price developments. Since we aim to relate these variables to the variation in management board compensation and investigate whether we find an effect of say on pay-votes after including these variables as control, we focus on those variables that play the main role in designing compensation packages for top managers. With respect to firm characteristics, we chose a measure for size, namely total assets (TA) as well as industry dummies (for 50 Within the traditional German system of corporate governance, the clout of the chairman of the management board ("Vorstandsvorsitzender") was a far cry from that of a U.S. CEO. His role as a primus inter pares is reflected for instance in AktG § 77(1) and 78(2) that prescribe joint decision making and representation of the corporation by all members of the management board as the default rule. the financial, the car and the pharmaceutical industry). We measure firm performance by their net-earnings on a cash-flow basis (EBIT) as well as return-on-assets earned in the respective year (ROA) defined as EBIT over TA. Stock price movements (SHARECH) are measured on a year-to-year basis (end of year). We also looked into other firm characteristics as well as performance measures but the variables ultimately used turned out to have the closest relation to management compensation. The realizations of these variables are depicted in table 2.
In order to check to what extent ownership concentration could function as a way to counterbalance managerial control 51 and could thus substitute for a Germanstyle say on pay-regulation, we looked into the ownership concentration in the companies under scrutiny. For the purpose of measuring the concentration of ownership (OC), we constructed and used a measure of the role of blockholders. This variable depicts the sum of all shares possessed by shareholders, which own individually more than three percent of all shares of the company. The intuition is that even a minority blockholder has some momentum to influence the supervisory board's determination of management compensation packages that comes close to the impact of voluntary, non-binding say on pay-votes. The realization of this variable is also described in table 2.
Insert Table 2 about here   Table 2 shows that there is substantial variation in firm characteristics, performance and ownership structure. This indicates on the one hand that the DAX30 companies differ, in pertinent respect, to a large extent among themselves. But as we will show in the next step, there is also substantial variation, especially with respect to profitability, over time.
Before we turn to this analysis, we comment on the say on pay-votes in the DAX30 companies that occurred after the 2009 amendment of the AktG. All companies in our data sample had a vote on management board remuneration in 2010. In 2011 to 2014 these votes took only place occasionally. We have constructed a variable (SOP), which documents the acceptance rate of the votes in the shareholder meeting. 52 In order to avoid this variable to be biased due to time periods and companies in which no votes have taken place, we use the percentage points of positive votes in occasions where votes actually take place and set it to 100 in all other cases.
We observe 52 (out of 232) data points with say on pay-votes. Most of these resolutions had very high acceptance rates, most of them above 85%, many of them even above 95%. 53 There are only three exceptions in which compensation schemes received lower acceptance ratios: Deutsche Börse in 2010 with an acceptance rate of 52.7%, Deutsche Bank with 58.2% in the same year and SAP in 2012 with 65.6%.
We explore two alternative hypotheses to address the impact of say-on-pay votes. The first hypothesis conjectures that relatively lower acceptance ratios lead to an adjustment (likely, yet not necessarily a reduction) in the remuneration package of all management board members. 54 We test this with our SOP variable. We distinguish between the say on pay-votes of the same year and those of the previous year, thus allowing some reaction-lag of the supervisory board. The second, alternative hypothesis is that the supervisory board 55 primarily reacts by changing the compensation packages laid-down in the contracts of newly entering members of the management board and leaves the contracts of the existing executives untouched. This hypothesis seems highly plausible from a basic contract law perspective: although the supervisory board is competent to determine the remuneration of the members of executive board when they are appointed, 56 it basically lacks the power to interfere unilaterally with existing employment contracts without cause. Hence, it is inconceivable that with a view to unfavorable say on pay-votes, supervisory boards reduce executive compensation packages immediately and universally. However, at least for those management board members who are (re)appointed after a resolution, compensation arrangements designed with a view to expressed discontent in shareholder polls are intuitive. This would lead us to expect significant changes (reductions) in compensation of newly entering members in reaction to low say on pay-votes. We test this second hypothesis with an interaction term of the SOP variable with a dummy representing newly entering board members.
Before we turn to these tests, we explore the relationship between compensation and firm characteristics and structures in a univariate setting.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS
As a first step of our analysis of the determinants of the remuneration (level and structure) we investigate the total level of compensation as well as its performance-based fraction as a function of firm performance. We use figure 1 to depict this relationship. Figure 1 plots the means of three main payment variables (TEXP, TEXPCEO and VARPAY) vis-à-vis the key performance measures EBIT and ROA.
Insert Figure 1 about here Figure 1 indicates that there is a rather strong relation between firm performance and the compensation of management board members. The observable link is most pronounced with respect to CEO pay but it is also present (in a univariate sense) with respect to other members of the management board. 57 This illustration already reveals a number of key insights.
First, it appears to be the case that over the entire period of our analysis there is at best only a slight upside trend in top management compensation. When we compare the 2006 figures with the ones in 2014, we observe a nominal increase in total compensation ex pensions in line with inflation (for CEOs) and below inflation (for all board members). When looking into the numbers for pension contributions paid for members of the management board plus the fixed payments a very similar picture emerges. Taking the two components together the numbers (on average) add up to 1,121 TEUR in 2006 and 1,215 TEUR in 2014. At the end of our sample period in 2014 we see an increase slightly above inflation but below the average rise in employee income in Germany of about 13% over the entire time period. A look at the two remuneration components reveals a shift towards more fixed pay (increasing on average from 700 TEUR to 879 TEUR) but less pensions (422 TEUR in 2006 and 318 TEUR in 2014) .
Second, Figure 1 indicates the existence of the sensitivity of variable management pay to firm performance. This is most obvious for CEO pay but seems to be present also for the other members of the management board. The correlation coefficient between TEXP (TEXPCEO) and EBIT is an astonishing 0.338 (0.459) but rather low for EBITTA, namely 0.045 (0.066). We investigate this relation in a multivariate setting in the next subsection.
Last but not least, we conjecture at this stage that management board pay has not been removed from economic developments (neither at the macro-level nor at the company level). Whether this conjecture survives a more detailed, multivariate analysis, which allows to control for other factors, is the subject of the next section, in which we also aim to look into the detailed implications of say on pay regulation.
MULTIVARIATE TESTS
Up to now we did not sufficiently take the panel structure of our data set into account. Hence, the aim of this subsection is to exploit the variation in the cross-section as well as over time simultaneously. We run linear regressions on our panel data set while taking the different compensation variables as dependent variables. This includes our two variables measuring total compensation (we always exclude pensions in order to avoid losing too many observations due to missing entries) as well as our variable-pay measure and fixed-pay variables. We proceed in various steps. In the first one, we aim to explain the compensation variables by using firm characteristics and firm operative performance as well as a trend variable as explanatory variables in order to check to which extent compensation packages are aligned with the objective function of shareholders, who seek to maximize the return on their investment. In a second step, we test our two hypotheses regarding the impact of say on pay regulation. First, we include our SOP variable and the lagged SOP variable to test our first hypothesis. Second, we introduce an interaction term to investigate the SOP decisions on the compensation of the newly entering members of the management board. Thereby, we test our second hypothesis. Furthermore we investigate the effects of ownership on general management board compensation as well as drivers of compensation of newly entering management board members. Our random effects estimation hence has the following structure:
With our compensation variables forming the right-hand-side variables and the Xj standing for our explanatory variables as described above. The error term is displayed by . In most of our regressions we did not only include industry dummies but also board members fixed effects to account for unobservable characteristics of individual board members. A time trend variable accounted for the potential time trend in compensation.
Tables 3 and 4 summarize our findings. As a further robustness test we have undertaken firm-fixed effect estimations, which, however, left our findings rather unchanged. This indicates that our measures for firm characteristics take up most of the variation across firms.
Insert Tables 3 and 4 about here The most obvious result of our regression analysis is that total compensation of the management board members in Germany's DAX30 companies is clearly influenced by firm structure and firm performance. This holds true for newly entering members (see model 7, table 3) as well as for all members of the management board (models 1 and 2, table 3) and the CEOs (models 1 and 2 in Table 4 ). In particular, a higher EBIT leads to larger overall compensation, indicating in a sense, that EBIT plays a crucial technical role in the rule governing the contracts of management board members. The impact of the relative returns-on-assets measure is also positive for exiting management board members but this effect is neither observable for newly entering board member nor for CEOs. The effects are not only of high statistical significance but also economically pronounced. For every thousand Euros of EBIT, the average management board members receives roughly 15 Eurocents, the CEO even almost twice as much. For the entire management board an increase in EBIT by a thousand Euros increases their salary by more than one Euro. Hence, we find that the compensation packages of the members of the DAX30 management boards are positively aligned with the objectives of value maximizing shareholders. This alignment takes place mainly via operative performance measures; stock price changes seem to play a subordinate role (this we find in unreported regressions). The same holds true with respect to ownership structure, which has no statistically significant influence on the compensation of management. Aside of this, we find-clearly indicated by the industry dummies-that at least in the time period of our sample the car industry paid significantly higher salaries (the industry dummy for the car industry is persistently positive and highly significant), whereas the financial industry and the pharmaceutical industry paid their management board members significantly less. This observation is driven in part by Commerzbank, which was bailed-out by the German financial market stabilization fund in 2008 and 2009 which led to salary caps: the government rescue obliged the bank to limit the remuneration to 500.000 Euro for its top personnel. 58 We investigated in robustness checks that our results are unaffected by excluding these observations. We created, in unreported regressions, a dummy variable to test the impact of these firm-specific developments on the financial industry in our sample. Although the dummy variable is negative and statistically highly significant, Commerzbank is not the sole driver for our results, because the financial industry coefficient remains negative and statistically significant for the other financials in our sample. The same is true for all other results.
Insert Tables 5 and 6 about here With respect to our two hypotheses we find astonishing results. First, our results in all our regressions clearly allow us to reject our first hypothesis. The SOP variable is either not significant or has the wrong sign. The latter is in particular true for the lagged SOP variable. Throughout most of our regressions (the only exception being the fixed-pay regression) we find a negative and significant effect of the lagged SOP variable. The SOP variable without the lag is never significant. Hence, we can reject hypothesis number 1. This finding seems to be in stark contrast to prior research on the pertinent impact of the German say on pay-vote that finds a significant long-term effect of negative voting-outcomes on executive compensation. 59 However, given the restrictions defined in contract law, 60 our findings do not really come as a surprise. Instead, they are a function of a lack of bargaining power of supervisory boards vis-à-vis incumbents who cannot be compelled to accept a decrease in their remuneration packages-or any rearrangement with such an effect-if the supervisory board wishes to react to shareholder discontent.
However, at least for those management board members, who were newly appointed around the promulgation of the VorstAG, 61 compensation arrangements designed with a view to the anticipated shareholder polls or the realized SOP decisions are plausible. In line with this idea we find strong evidence for our second hypothesis. SOP votes have a significant effect on compensation schemes of newly entering members of management boards. The sign of this effect is in line with our hypothesis: it is positive indicating that low SOP votes led to significant reductions of the compensation of newly entering board members. This is true with respect to total compensation as well as variable pay (see models 6 in Tables 3 and 5 ). The effect in the CEO regression has the opposite sign. However in this model, entry is a different concept, because it also affects members who switch from ordinary board members to become a CEO.
Our analysis allows us to draw inferences on the channels through which say on pay actually works. With this important supplement, our results are in line with the general observations in prior research. 
CONCLUSION
In a nutshell, our main findings can be summarized as follows. First, we observe that the compensation packages of management board members of Germany's DAX30-firms are closely linked to key performance measures such as return-on-assets and EBIT. Second, our analysis indicates that ownership concentration has no significant effect on compensation, which can be read as support of the view that managerial self-serving by usurping the payroll is largely absent even where companies exhibit dispersed share ownership. Third, and most important for our topic, our findings suggest that it pays a lot to take a closer look to the contractual set-up of the compensation schemes. When considering only the overall board members' compensation, the hypothesis of lower remuneration in case of low shareholder support for compensation packages in say on pay-votes can be rejected. Our findings do not support this view, which is not at all surprising given the rather rigid contractual framework for the 59 Powell & Rapp, supra note 40 at 25-6. 60 See supra 3.2. 61 The maximum tenure permitted by law is 5 years, which regularly makes for deeply staggered management boards. The important takeaway for our analysis is thus that every year about one fifth of the management board should be up for (re-)appointment. 62 See Powell & Rapp, supra note 40 at 25-6. compensation of management board members. However, we find that the supervisory board seems to be responsive to say on pay-votes when it comes to the design of newly entering candidates. We should, however, at the same time note that our results are driven by a number of pronounced say on pay-votes in corporate Germany. Most of the observations in our dataset show rather strong shareholder support for the proposed schemes.
-21 - -24 - -25 - We estimate linear regressions on our panel data set. The table shows the estimated effects of the regressions with the standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels are: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. In models 1-5 the variable compensation of all management board members is on the left hand side. In model we concentrate on the compensation of newly entering members of the management board.
-26 - 3.34% We estimate linear regressions on our panel data set. The table shows the estimated effects of the regressions with the standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels are: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. In models 1-5 the fixed part of the compensation of all management board members is on the left hand side. In model we concentrate on the compensation of newly entering members of the management board. 
